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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the risk-adjusted performance and differential fund flows for socially 
responsible mutual funds (SRMF). The results show that SRMF rated high on ESG, perform better than 
lower rated ESG funds during the period of economic crisis. The findings also show that low ESG rated 
SRMF had higher differential cash-flows than high rated ESG funds except for the period of economic 
down turn. The findings are of interest to financial advisors, investors, mutual fund managers, and 
researchers on how SRMF performance responds to periods of economic downturn and expansion. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Do socially responsible mutual funds (SRMF) that rate higher on social responsibility score have 
higher risk-adjusted returns compared to SRMF funds with a lower rating?  Do higher rated SRMF receive 
more cash inflows than SRMF with a lower rating? Is the relationship between risk-adjusted return and 
social responsibility score consistent over different economic cycles?  This study attempts to address these 
questions. 
According to US SIF (2016), investment in the US-based SRMF has grown over the past two years 
by 33% with assets under management totaling $8.72 trillion at the beginning of 2016. Prior academic 
research by Nofsinger and Varma (2014), Renneboog, Horst, and Zhang, (2008), and Bollen (2007) on 
SRMF has focused primarily on comparing the performance of conventional mutual funds with SRMF. 
Renneboog et al. (2008) hypothesize that the superior performance of SRMF funds compared to 
conventional funds can be attributed to the fund-portfolio composition. An explanation could be that the 
 SRMF funds invest in companies that demonstrate corporate social responsibility and transparency of their 
operations. It is expected that these companies are likely to be better managed and hence, generate better 
risk-adjusted performance. While this conjecture has produced some mixed findings, Rathner (2013) in a 
meta-analysis study, find no statistical difference in performance between US-domiciled SRMF and 
conventional funds. However, Nofsinger and Varma (2014), find that SRMF outperformed conventional 
funds during periods of market crisis and underperformed during non-crisis periods. 
Very little research has been conducted on the determinants of performance and fund flow among 
SRMF funds. Given the recent growth in the SRMF, there is a need to explore the characteristics of SRMF 
that explain the risk-adjusted performance within the SRMF universe. This study investigates whether 
SMRF social performance ratings translate into higher risk-adjusted returns. Based on the Morningstar® 
Portfolio ESG ScoreTM (ESG Score) (Justice & Hale, 2016), this study categorizes the SRMF into low, mid, 
and high ESG groups.  Specifically, this study examines whether socially responsible funds with high ESG 
ratings outperform the lower ESG rated funds on a risk-adjusted basis. 
The study also examines whether the differential flow of SRMF can be explained solely by the 
assigned ESG rating controlling for past fund performance on the risk-adjusted basis, and other important 
factors. The findings from this study will build on the current understanding of how the social-responsibility 
ratings of funds relate to fund performance and differential fund flow for the SRMF.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Financial Performance 
 
Risk-Adjusted Return. Previous researchers find no difference in risk-adjusted performance of 
SRMF and conventional funds using different social responsible rating systems. The studies include 
Hamilton, Jo, and Statman (1993), Statman (2000), Bello (2005), Shank, Manullang, and Hill (2005), Gil-
Bazo, Ruiz-Verdú, and Santos (2010), Renneboog et al. (2008) and Rodríguez (2010). Gil-Bazo et al. 
(2010) conclude that SRMF have a superior risk-adjusted performance compared to conventional funds 
before and after adjusting for costs. They also found that when SRMF were managed by companies 
specializing in social responsibility, SRMF outperformed conventional funds. On the contrary, Chang and 
Witte (2010) study find no difference in risk-adjusted performance between SMRF and conventional funds 
except two categories: balanced funds and fixed-income funds.  
 
Fund Flow. As to the relationship between fund flow and fund performance, Bollen (2006) 
concludes that monthly fund flow volatility of SRMF is lower than conventional funds.  Cash-flows into 
SRMF are more sensitive (less sensitive) to lagged positive (negative) performance than are cash-inflows 
into conventional funds. Furthermore, the study finds the difference between SRMF and conventional funds 
was robust over time and persisted as funds age. In a similar study, Renneboog et al. (2008)  investigate the 
effect of smart money, i.e., whether investors select funds that generate superior performance in subsequent 
periods. They find no difference in the alphas for the inflow and outflow portfolios of SRMF and 
conventional funds domiciled in the United States. They also find that alphas for inflow portfolios are not 
significantly different from zero, suggesting that investors are unable to select funds that would outperform 
the benchmark factors in the future, but can identify funds with poor performance. Nofsinger and Varma 
(2014) find that SRMF assets under management (AUM) increased by more than 13 percent during 2007-
2009 while conventional funds remained relatively flat. SRMF also outperformed the conventional funds 
during the market crisis but underperformed the conventional funds during normal economic cycles (non-
crisis periods). The authors conclude that this difference can be attributed to the socially responsible 
 characteristics of the underlying stocks within the portfolio rather than the stock picking ability or portfolio 
management skills of SRMF fund managers.  
 
Investor Motivation. Studies from household finance have found that cultural differences among 
households play a role in many investors’ decision to prefer safety and more stable forms of investments 
(Chatterjee & Zahirovic-Herbert, 2014; 2011; Kim et al., 2012). Investors’ motivation to invest in SRMF 
has increased over the recent years. Studies by Bollen (2007) and Statman (2005) posit that investments in 
SRMF have become popular because investors who believe in stewardship of environmental responsibility, 
socially responsible behavior, and ethical corporate governance and leadership derive utility from investing 
in socially responsible funds. For these investors, the utility derived from making investments consistent 
with their ethical and moral values sometimes supersedes the utility generated purely based on a profit 
motive.  
 
Investor Characteristics. Researchers have examined the characteristics of investors who 
participate in socially responsible investing. Nilsson (2008) identifies three types of investors that 
participate in the SRMF. The first type of investor is solely motivated by mandate of social responsibility. 
The second type of investor is motivated by the investment return of the funds and only interested in SRMF 
if they can earn a higher return than conventional funds. The third type of investor has a dual objective—a 
social responsibility mandate and a profit motive.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Conceptual Framework 
 
 The conceptual framework for this study is developed based on prior SRMF studies. Nofsinger and 
Varma (2014) find that SRMF funds outperform conventional funds during periods of higher market 
volatility but probably underperform the market during periods of non-crisis. It is therefore expected that 
the high ESG rated mutual funds will similarly outperform the low ESG rated mutual funds during periods 
of economic crisis but underperform the low ESG rated mutual funds under normal market conditions. This 
dampening effect on the downside risk for high ESG rated funds is likely due to the type of companies the 
funds held within their portfolios. The underlying stocks of the companies in the SRMF with high ESG 
score are less likely to have exposure to extreme negative events because of the environment, social, and 
governance mandates in these companies. For example, the underlying portfolios of high ESG score SRMF 
funds will have lower exposure to costs arising from irresponsible stewardship of the environment, poor 
stewardship of financial resources, or from stakeholder lawsuits. According to Mcguire, Sundgren, and 
Schneeweis (1988), the socially responsible firms held within the portfolios of high ESG rated funds will 
likely have more positive associations with the respective communities and regulators in the industries 
within which they operate. Additionally, Verwijmeren and Derwall (2010) find that firms that provide 
greater employee satisfaction are less likely to exhibit bankruptcy risks. As a result, the performances of 
socially responsible stocks (and the mutual funds holding these securities) are expected to be stable and 
less risky during periods of regular market activity as well as during periods of market crisis.  
 The Psychological Attraction Theory of financial regulations by Hirshleifer (2007) posits that the 
government and the policymakers are more likely to impose stronger regulations in the marketplace 
reactively rather than proactively in response to a crisis. Shefrin and Statman (1993) argue that although 
the qualities of lower risk and higher standards of responsibility are practiced by the socially responsible 
companies (and by default in funds holding these securities) during all economic cycles, the advantages of 
this low-risk and socially responsible mandate are noticed by stakeholders (investors, government, and 
policy makers) during periods of market uncertainty.  It is therefore expected that differential flows into 
highly rated socially responsible funds would also increase during periods of market uncertainty. The 
government, policymakers, and other important stakeholders are more likely to come up with regulations 
negatively affecting the bad actors immediately following an economic crisis. The socially responsible 
 firms that self-impose a higher standard of responsibility, are less likely to be negatively affected by any 
new regulation that might be brought into the industry. Hence, socially responsible corporations are 
expected to be penalized less during periods of the market downturn than other firms.   
According to the Prospect Theory by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), investors’ perceived decline 
in utility from a loss is higher than their increase in perceived utility for an equivalent amount of gain. 
Therefore, the risk averse investors will be willing to sacrifice some return during normal economic times 
and favor of more stable performances in their portfolios during periods of market uncertainty. Furthermore, 
Cox, Brammer, and Millington (2004) find that  institutional portfolios managers prefer investing in 
corporations with strong corporate governance because of their stable performance related characteristics. 
 
Hypotheses 
 
Based on the conceptual framework and the findings from previous literature, this study 
hypothesizes that higher ESG rated funds have higher risk-adjusted return compared to lower ESG rated 
funds. This study also expects higher differential flows into the higher ESG rated funds compared to lower 
ESG rated funds because of the greater expected stability of these funds over all periods and because these 
funds will be more attractive to investors with a socially responsible mandate. 
 
 H1: The lower ESG rated SRMF will underperform the higher ESG rated funds after controlling 
for other fund related characteristics.   
H2: The lower ESG rated SRMF will receive lower differential flow than higher ESG rated SRMF 
after controlling for other fund related characteristics. 
 
 
 
 
Data Selection 
 
The data is from the Morningstar® database and covers the time-period from 2005 to 2016. The 
funds are selected based on the following criteria: had a socially responsible mandate; domiciled in the 
United States; and surviving funds from 2005 to 2016 that were rated in the top half of Morningstar® 
Sustainability RatingTM. The Morningstar® Portfolio ESG ScoreTM (ESG Score) is used to categorize the 
SRMF in this study. Based on these screening criteria the total sample narrowed down to 73 SRMF that 
survived the entire study period (2005-2016). Thus, the study consists of 12 years of monthly data. The 
study divides the study-period into 3 sub-periods 2005-2008 (the period before and during the Great 
recession), 2009-2012 (the period of recovery immediately after the Great Recession), and 2013-2016 
(period of economic expansion).  
  Morningstar® database includes the ESG ratings for funds that incorporates environmental, social, 
and governance factors. Environmental issues include climate change and carbon emissions, air and water 
pollution, energy efficiency, water scarcity, waste management and deforestation. Social issues include 
product safety, data protection/privacy, gender and diversity, employee engagement, supply chain 
management, and labor standards. Governance issues include board composition, audit committee 
structure, executive compensation, lobbying, political contributions and bribery and corruption.  
This study divides the funds into tertile, where funds in top 33% of the assigned ESG scores are 
categorized as High ESG, followed by funds in the middle 33% of ESG scores which are categorized as 
Mid ESG, and funds in the lowest 33% of ESG scores are categorized as Low ESG. Binary variables are 
created to represent each tertile as a variable in the empirical model.  
 
Empirical Analyses  
 
 The study uses ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models to understand the impact of SRMF 
fund ratings on the risk-adjusted performance and differential flow of investments into SRMF funds after 
controlling for fundamental factors. The fundamental factors used in the study are management tenure, 
expense ratio, age, and fund size. The study carries out this analysis for the complete study period (2005-
2016) and the three sub-periods (2005-2008, 2009-2012, and 2013-2016). The control variables included 
in the empirical models have been found to be associated with fund performance in previous literature. To 
examine whether ESG ratings are significantly associated with monthly returns among the SRMF funds, 
the study regresses the rolling average of the Sharpe ratio against fundamental factors. The regression model 
is as follows:  
𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑃𝐸𝑖 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑚𝑖𝑑_𝑒𝑠𝑔𝑀𝑖𝑑_𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑖 + 𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑤_𝑒𝑠𝑔𝐿𝑜𝑤_𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑖 + 𝛽𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑖                               
                    + 𝛽𝑒𝑥𝑝𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖                                           (1) 
 
Where: 
𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑃𝐸𝑖 is the rolling average Sharpe ratio of the mutual funds. Sharpe ratio is calculated as 
follows: 
𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑃𝐸𝑖  =
(Rp−Rf)
σp
           (2) 
where: 
𝑅𝑝 is the return of the mutual fund 
𝑅𝑓 is the risk free rate 
σp is the standard deviation of the portfolio  
𝑀𝑖𝑑_𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑖is a binary variable for funds in the middle 33% of the ESG ratings, and 𝐿𝑜𝑤_𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑖 are 
the funds in the lowest 33% of the ESG ratings (compared against the reference group of funds in 
the highest 33% of the ESG ratings, 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ_𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑖). 
𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑖represents the control for management tenure. Previous studies by Kostovetsky (2017), 
Amihud and Goyenko (2013), Lin and Yung (2004), find management tenure to be a predictor of 
mutual fund performance.  
𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖 is the expense ratio of the funds. Tufano and Sevick (1997), Del Guercio, Dann, and Partch 
(2003), Malhotra, Jaramillo, and Martin (2011) find that better managed funds have lower expense 
ratios.  
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 the fund size, is included as a control variable because previous studies by Berk and Green 
(2004), and Bauer, Koedijk, and Otten (2005) find that fund size is associated with both fund 
performance and cash-flows in mutual funds. 
𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖 is the control for fund’s age. Chevalier and Ellison (1999) and Grinblatt and Titman (1989) 
find age to be associated with mutual fund performance. 
Investor sentiment is measured as the level of differential flow. Under status quo, every SRMF 
should experience an inflow (outflow) of funds that is proportional to the percentage of the SRMF industry 
assets that the fund owns. This is the theoretical flow for the SRMF fund. In short, with nothing changing, 
the study expects the SRMF fund’s representation in the industry, in terms of it share to remain fixed.  
Differential flow is the extra flow of funds that an SRMF fund receives over and above its theoretical flow 
(proportional flow). The differential flow is calculated as a difference of real flow and theoretical flow 
divided by theoretical flow. The model is expressed using the following equations: 
FLt
i =  AUMt
i − AUMt−1 
i (1 − rt 
i )              (3) 
FLt
i =  AUMt
i − AUMt−1 
i (1 − rt 
i )            (4)   
FL̿̿ ̿t
i =  
AUMt−1
i
AUMt−1
Agg  ×  FLt 
Agg
         (5)  
AUMt−1
Agg
+ ∑ (AUMt−1)
N
i=1         (6) 
 FLi
Agg
  ∑ (FLt)i 
N
i=1          (7) 
Diff(FLt
i ) =  
FL−FL̿̿̿̿ t
i
FLt
i              (8)  
where  
FLt
i  is the real flow for SRMF fund i in time-period t, 
AUMt
i represents assets under management for SRMF category i in time-period t, 
AUMt−1
i  is the assets under management for SRMF category i in previous time-period t-1, 
rt
i is the return SRMF Category i in time-period t, 
FL̿̿ ?̿? is the theoretical flow for SRMF Category i in time-period t, 
AUMt−1
Agg
  is the assets under management for all the SRMF Categories in the database (a good proxy for the 
SRMF industry size) for time-period t-1.  
FL𝐴𝑔𝑔  is flow of funds (new money) to the SRMF industry for time-period t, and  𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓(𝐹𝐿𝑡
𝑖 ) is the 
differential flow of funds to SRMF Category i in time-period t, 
Equations 3 through 7 describe the model that the study uses to calculate investor sentiment. When  
𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓(𝐹𝐿𝑡
𝑖 )is positive there is a net inflow of excess funds and when it is negative the SRMF Category 
experienced an outflow of funds. It is important to realize that this study is not interested in measuring 
inflow or outflow. The study measures excess inflow or outflow experienced by that category.  
The regression model is as follows:  
𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓(𝐹𝐿𝑖𝑡) =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛[𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1]+ 𝛽𝑚𝑖𝑑_𝑒𝑠𝑔[𝐷𝑚𝑖𝑑_𝑒𝑠𝑔𝑖,] + 𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑤_𝑒𝑠𝑔[𝐷𝑙𝑜𝑤_𝑒𝑠𝑔𝑖,] +
               𝛽𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒[𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑖] +  𝛽𝑒𝑥𝑝[𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,] +  𝛽𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒[𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖] + 𝛽𝑎𝑔𝑒[𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖] + 𝜀𝑝𝑡           (9)  
where: 
  is the differential flow of funds to SRMF fund i in year t, 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1Ri,t is the monthly return of the fund lagged by 1 period;  
𝐷𝑚𝑖𝑑_𝑒𝑠𝑔𝑖,is a binary variable for funds in the middle 33% of the ESG ratings and 𝐷𝑙𝑜𝑤_𝑒𝑠𝑔𝑖,are the funds in 
the lowest 33% of the ESG ratings (compared against the reference group of funds in the highest 33% of 
the ESG ratings);  
𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑖 is the management tenure;  
𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,is the expense ratio of the funds;  
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 is the fund size; and  
𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖is the fund’s age 
The above empirical models (Sharpe Ratio and Differential Flow) from equations 1 through 8 are run for 
the 2005-2016; 2005-2008; 2009-2012; and 2012-2016 periods. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 1 and broken down into Panels reflecting the complete 
study period of 144 months and the three sub-periods of 48 months each. 
Time-period 2005-2016 (Panel A). During the 2005-2016 period, the monthly returns are 
significantly higher for Low ESG funds (0.65; p<0.01) than for Mid ESG and High ESG funds. However, 
the risk-adjusted returns, as shown by the Sharpe ratio, are significantly higher for Mid ESG funds than for 
High ESG funds (0.76; p<0.001). The Mid ESG funds also have significantly lower expense ratios 
 FLDiff it
 compared to the Low ESG and High ESG funds (1.09; p<0.001). However, Low ESG funds received the 
most monthly cash inflow during this period than the other ESG fund categories.  
Time-period 2005-2008 (Panel B). The average return of funds during the 2005-2008 period, 
which included the 2008 market crash, is negative for all ESG fund categories. The High ESG funds have 
the lowest average negative monthly return (-0.32%; p<0.001) and the highest Sharpe Ratio during this 
period (0.56; p<0.001) compared to the Low ESG and Mid ESG funds. The Mid ESG funds have the lowest 
expense ratios (1.09; p<0.001), and the Low ESG funds have the highest fund flow during this period 
($129,944; p<0.001) compared to the other ESG fund categories.  
Time-period 2009-2012 (Panel C). The 2009-2012 period witnessed a slow economic recovery 
from the stock market crash of 2008. The Low ESG funds have the highest average monthly return 
compared to the other fund categories during this period (1.33%; p<0.001). The Low ESG funds also have 
the highest Sharpe ratio, although the chi-square test results for Sharpe ratios are not significant.   The Mid 
ESG funds have the lowest expense ratios (1.12; p<0.001) and received the highest monthly cash-flow 
($819,636; p<0.001) compared to Mid ESG and High ESG funds during this period. 
Time-period 2013-2016 (Panel D). The US economy witnessed strong economic recovery during 
the 2013-2016 period. Similar to the prior study period, the Low ESG funds have the highest average return 
during this period (0.99; p<0.001). However, Mid ESG funds have the highest average Sharpe ratio (1.26; 
p<0.001) and the lowest expense ratios (1.08; p<0.001) compared to the Low ESG and High ESG funds 
during this period. Consistent with the prior time-period, the Low ESG funds received the most cash inflow 
($688,974; p<0.001) compare to Mid ESG and High ESG funds. 
In summary, across the three time-periods, monthly returns were significantly higher for Low ESG 
funds than the other funds, except during the great recession. Depending on the time-period examined, the 
results on the Sharpe ratio varied during the great recession, High ESG funds performed significantly better 
than the other fund categories. During the beginning of the recovery, there were no significant differences 
in performance among the fund categories.  In the later period when recovery was stronger, Mid ESG funds 
performed significantly better than the other fund categories. For all three time-periods, Mid ESG had the 
lowest expense ratio. Low ESG funds received the most positive differential cash-flows for all three periods 
except for 2005-2008 when it had a higher positive cash-flow of $1,297,944 compared to High ESG funds 
with $1,270,021.  
 
Risk-Adjusted Returns 
 
Table 2 presents the results of regression run on the Sharpe Ratio as the dependent variable. The 
Sharpe Ratio is a measure of risk-adjusted return. The regression results were divided into four different 
panels: Panel A represented the time-period of the entire study between the years 2005 and 2016; Panel B 
represented the pre-recession and through the great recession time-period between the years 2005 and 
2008; Panel C represented the post-recession time-period between the years 2009 and 2012; and Panel D 
represented the time-period between the years 2013 and 2016, the time of economic expansion.  
Time-period 2005-2016 (Panel A). During the overall 2005-2016 period, Low ESG funds have 
significantly higher risk-adjusted return when compared with the reference group of SRMF in High ESG. 
Similarly, management tenure is positively associated with risk-adjusted returns of the funds. The expense 
ratios and fund size are significant and negatively associated with the risk-adjusted return of the funds.  
Time-period 2005-2008 (Panel B). During the 2005-2008 period, Low ESG funds and Mid ESG 
funds have significantly lower risk-adjusted return when compared with the reference group of High ESG. 
Management tenure is positively associated with the risk-adjusted return of the funds during this period. 
The expense ratio is significant and negatively associated with risk-adjusted returns of the funds during this 
period.  
Time-period 2009-2012 (Panel C). During the 2009-2012 period, Low ESG and Mid ESG funds 
have significantly higher risk-adjusted returns when compared High ESG funds. The expense ratios and 
fund size were significant and negatively associated with risk-adjusted returns of the funds during this 
period.  
 Time-period 2013-2016 (Panel D). During the 2013-2016 period, Low ESG and Mid ESG funds 
had significantly higher risk-adjusted returns when compared with the reference group High ESG. The 
expense ratios and fund size are significant and negatively associated with risk-adjusted returns of the funds 
during this period.  
 
Fund Flows 
 
Table 3 presents the results of regression run on the differential flow as the dependent variable. 
Time-period 2005-2016 (Panel A). The results show that during the overall 2005-2016 period, 
Low ESG funds have significantly higher fund flows and Mid ESG have significantly lower fund flows 
when compared with the reference group of High ESG funds. The monthly return in the previous period is 
significant and positively associated with fund flows in the subsequent period. Similarly, management 
tenure is also positively associated with positive fund flows. The expense ratio is significant and negatively 
associated with fund flows during this period.  
Time-period 2005-2008 (Panel B). During the 2005-2008 period, the fund flows for the Low ESG 
and Mid ESG funds did not significantly differ from the High ESG fund flows.  The monthly return in the 
previous period is significant and positively associated with fund flows in the subsequent period. Similarly, 
fund size is positively associated with positive fund flows.  
Time-period 2009-2012 (Panel C). The results indicate that during the 2009-2012 period, the Low 
ESG funds have significantly higher fund flows and the Mid ESG funds have significantly lower fund flows 
when compared with the reference group of High ESG funds. The monthly return in the previous period is 
significant and positively associated with fund flows in the subsequent period. Similarly, management 
tenure is positively associated with positive fund flows. The expense ratio is significant and negatively 
associated with fund flows during this period.  
Time-period 2013-2016 (Panel D). During the 2013-2016 period, the results show that Low ESG 
funds have significantly higher fund flows and Mid ESG funds have significantly lower fund flows when 
compared with the reference group of SRMFs High ESG funds. The monthly return in the previous period 
is significant and positively associated with fund flows in the subsequent period. Similarly, management 
tenure is positively associated with positive fund flows. The expense ratio is significant and negatively 
associated with fund flows during this period.  
 
DISCUSSION and CONCLUSION 
 
 Using the 2005-2016 SRMF data from Morningstar® the study examines the risk-adjusted 
performances and differential flows across the highest rated, medium rated, and lower rated ESG funds. 
The results indicate that compared to the highest rated ESG funds, the Sharpe ratios for medium and lowest 
rated mutual funds are higher over the 2009-2016 period. However, in the 2005-2008 panel that included 
the period of severe market downturn, the lowest and the medium rated SRMF funds have a lower Sharpe 
ratio than the highest rated SRMF funds. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that lower rated 
SRMF funds under performed the highest rate SRMF during periods of market downturn. These findings 
are similar to the findings of Nofsinger and Varma (2014) that the SRMF outperformed the conventional 
mutual funds during periods of market uncertainty but underperformed during other times of normal 
economic activity. 
 The findings partially support the second hypothesis that differential flow will be lower for the 
lower ESG rated SRMF when compared with the higher rated SRMF because investors preferred the 
stability and lower volatility that socially responsible funds offer. The results show that medium rated ESG 
funds had a lower differential flow, but the SRMF funds in the lowest tertile had higher differential flows 
compared to the SRMF in the highest tertile of ESG scores.  The study finds that when compared with the 
SRMF in the top tertile of ESG scores, the lower rated funds have higher differential flow and medium 
rated SRMF funds have lower differential fund flows across all the periods except for the 2005-2008 period. 
More research is needed to understand the reason for this difference across the periods. This finding 
 corroborates with the findings from Nilsson (2008) that the SRMF investments attract different types of 
investors. Investors who value socially responsible mandates over profit motive were more likely to 
continue their investments into highly rated ESG funds, while investors who were driven mainly by a profit 
motive were more likely to invest money into the lowest rated ESG funds, which had the highest past returns 
during the periods of the study. The exception to this trend was observed during the 2005-2008 period when 
the markets fell significantly at the end of 2008. It is possible that many investors simply stayed away from 
investing during this period. Overall, the results corroborate with the findings from Bollen (2007) that 
differential flows are associated with the fund’s risk-adjusted performance in the previous period.  
 Furthermore, the study finds evidence that mutual fund expense ratios are negatively associated 
with risk-adjusted returns across the entire period of the study. These findings are consistent with Del 
Guercio et al. (2003) and Malhotra et al. (2011) that expense ratio is negatively associated with fund 
performance. Further, the study indicates that expense ratio is also negatively associated with fund flows 
in the post-recession period. It is possible that due to the downturn in financial markets, and greater media 
attention on performances of securities in the periods immediately following recession many investors were 
sensitive to costs and therefore avoided investing fresh money into the more expensive mutual funds with 
higher expense ratios. Among other variables, the study finds that fund size is negatively associated with 
differential flow during most of the study period, but the association between fund size and differential 
flows is positive during the period of great recession, thus indicating that during periods of market 
uncertainty, investors possibly look to fund size as a signal of quality. Further research is needed in the 
future to investigate this association. The finding that the highest ESG rated funds hold up better during 
conditions of volatility should be of interest to the financial advisors and financial planners, as a potential 
asset class for diversification, during periods of market uncertainty. 
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 Tables 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Year 2005-2016 (Panel A) 
ESG Category Monthly Return Sharpe Ratio Expense Ratio Fund Flow 
Low ESG 0.65 0.71 1.46  $934,520  
Mid ESG 0.56 0.76 1.09  $(15,000,000) 
High ESG 0.51 0.65 1.68  $(470,440) 
Overall 0.58 0.70 1.42  $(4,584,270) 
Chi-Squared **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 ***p<0.001 ***p<0.001 
 
Year 2005-2008 (Panel B) 
ESG Category Monthly Return Sharpe Ratio Expense Ratio Fund Flow 
Low-ESG -0.39 0.30 2.02  $1,297,944  
Mid-ESG -0.37 0.40 1.08  $ (17,000,000) 
High-ESG -0.32 0.56 1.66  $1,270,021  
Overall -0.36 0.42 1.60  $ (4,487,747) 
Chi-Squared ***p<0.001 ***p<0.001 ***p<0.001 ***p<0.001 
 
Year 2009-2013 (Panel C) 
ESG Category Monthly Return Sharpe Ratio Expense Ratio Fund Flow 
Low-ESG 1.33 0.63 1.23  $ 819,636  
Mid-ESG 1.12 0.60 1.12  $ (16,900,000) 
High-ESG 1.11 0.43 1.71  $ (1,483,530) 
Overall 1.19 0.56 1.36  $ (5,546,462) 
Chi-Squared ***p<0.001 p<0.347 ***p<0.001 ***p<0.001 
 
 Year 2013-2016 (Panel D) 
ESG Category Monthly Return Sharpe Ratio Expense Ratio Fund Flow 
Low-ESG 0.99 1.18 1.11  $688,794  
Med-ESG 0.94 1.26 1.08  $(11,300,000) 
High-ESG 0.75 0.96 1.66  $ (1,176,057) 
Overall 0.89 1.13 1.29  $ (3,716,703) 
Chi-Squared ***p<0.001 ***p<0.001  ***p<0.001 ***p<0.001 
 
  
 Table 2: Regression Results - Risk Adjusted Performance 
Sharpe Ratio 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
 
Panel C 
 
Panel D 
Yr. 05-16 
 
Yr. 05-08 
 
Yr. 09-12 
 
Yr. 13-16 
Coeff. 
 
Coeff. 
 
Coeff. 
 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
 
(SE) 
 
(SE) 
 
(SE) 
 
ESG Scores (Ref: High ESG) 
      
     Mid ESG 0.01 
 
-0.04* 
 
0.04** 
 
0.03*  
(0.85) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.02) 
     Low ESG 0.04*** 
 
-0.04* 
 
0.06*** 
 
0.05*  
(0.00) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.03) 
Management Tenure 0.004* 
 
0.004*** 
 
0.00 
 
0.00  
(0.002) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.78) 
 
(0.68) 
Expense Ratio -0.01* 
 
-0.03* 
 
-0.03** 
 
-0.03*  
(0.008) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Fund Size 0.02*** 
 
0.16 
 
0.00 
 
0.02***  
(0.00) 
 
(0.71) 
 
(0.65) 
 
(0.00) 
Age 0.01 
 
0.04 
 
0.08 
 
0.03  
(0.10) 
 
(0.92) 
 
(0.42) 
 
(0.31) 
Intercept 0.52*** 
 
1.10*** 
 
1.19*** 
 
0.89*** 
  (0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 3: Regression Results - Differential Flow 
Differential Flow 
Panel A  Panel B  Panel C  Panel D 
Yr. 05-16  Yr. 05-08  Yr. 09-12  Yr. 13-16 
Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff. 
(SE)  (SE)  (SE)  (SE) 
Lag_1 Monthly Return 0.34*** 
 
0.16*** 
 
0.52*** 
 
0.57*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.03) 
   Mid ESG -0.02** 
 
0.00 
 
-0.05** 
 
-0.03*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.01) 
   Low ESG 0.04*** 
 
0.01 
 
0.06*** 
 
0.04*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.01) 
Tenure 0.00*** 
 
0.00 
 
0.00** 
 
0.00*** 
 (0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
Expense Ratio -0.02 
 
0.00 
 
-0.05*** 
 
-0.03*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Fund Size -0.02*** 
 
0.00*** 
 
-0.02*** 
 
-0.03*** 
 (0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.09) 
 
(0.00) 
Age 0.01 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
-0.01 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.10) 
 
(0.00) 
Intercept 30.53*** 
 
31.27*** 
 
30.40*** 
 
29.00*** 
  (0.77) 
 
(0.70) 
 
(1.82) 
 
(1.12) 
***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05 
 
 
